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An economy is considered where a possibility to seek rents (a particular case of this activity is
corruption) exists along with production. A producer is able to hide part of his output from
both bribery and taxation. It is shown that the presence of a shadow sector has diﬀerent
eﬀects in economies with high and low rent-seeking.
As expected, in the economy with low corruption the direct law enforcement is bene-
ﬁcial for growth, and reduces the shadow sector. However, in the highly corrupt economy,
combating the shadow economy reduces output and increases corruption, while combating
corruption reduces the shadow economy.
JEL codes: D72, H26, O17, K42.
Keywords: corruption, rent-seeking, shadow economy, law enforcement, transition.1 Introduction
The importance of institutions and the structure of the economy for economic development
is now widely recognized. The impact that governance failures, such as corruption and the
shadow economy, have had upon economic growth cannot be underestimated: they aﬀect
countries all over the globe, especially in Africa and the former Soviet Union. Governance
matters, and the beneﬁts of good governance are higher per capita income, lower infant
mortality rates, literacy, and less inequality; while it is the poorest people and small businesses
that are most hurt by poor governance.
The shadow economy and corruption are known to always come together. However,
the study of these phenomena has been generally separate form each other, with exception
of empirical works (Johnson et al., 1998a, 1998b; Friedman et al., 2000). In this paper I
build a theoretical model of an economy with endogenous rent-seeking and a shadow sector.
It diﬀers from the branch of the literature dealing with production/predation and allocation
of talent (Acemoglu, 1995; Grossman, 1995; Murphy et al., 1993; Krueger, 1974) by the
presence of a possibility for a producer to hide part of the revenues from the tax authorities
and, consequently, from corrupt oﬃcials. On the other hand, it diﬀers from the shadow
economy literature (Loayza, 1996; Campos, 2000) in respect of the producer’s motivation to
enter the shadow economy (to ”go shadow”), and by the presence of mutual interdependence
of rent-seeking and shadow activities.
I will show that informal and unoﬃcial activities matter for growth, and that their in-
terdependence serves to alter the results of conventional economic policies aimed at decreasing
the extent of the shadow economy. Most interestingly, I argue that tax law enforcement (like
investing in the tax police and monitoring) has a detrimental impact on growth in a highly
corrupt economy, while it is beneﬁcial for an economy with no or little corruption. In the
highly corrupt economy, an increase in law enforcement above a certain level increases the
equilibrium corruption level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section deﬁnes the general
framework. Section 3 describes the assumptions made and solves the resulting model in the
multiple equilibria framework. Section 4 considers policy implications. Section 5 introduces
the cost for bribe-takers, in an economy with anti-corruption campaign. The last section
concludes. Appendix A is devoted to a revision of Acemoglu’s (1995) model and its equilibria
set. Appendix B contains proofs of the propositions. Appendix C gathers notation used in
the paper.
2F r a m e w o r k
This paper is an attempt to bring together two branches of literature in a theoretical study,
and to show that it is the interdependence between shadow economy and corruption that
matters for economic performance. In doing so, a special emphasis is made on the case
of the former socialist economies, because their problems are particularly aggravated and
deepened during the transition from a planned to a market economy. The speciﬁcf e a t u r e so f
transition economies are: structural disparities inherited from socialism; the tradition of rent-
seeking embedded in society; lack of established property rights that are partly substituted
1by the Maﬁa; etc. The low compliance, endemic corruption and red tape create speciﬁc
self-reinforcing mechanisms that lock such economies into the unproductive trajectory, where
rent-seeking and corruption thrive and the state can be captured by the Maﬁa (North, 1990;
Feige, 1997; Friedman et al., 2000; Savvateev and Polishchuk, 1998; Murphy et al., 1993; Frye
and Schleifer, 1997). The following deﬁnitions are used throughout the paper:
Deﬁnition 1 Rent-seeking is an unproductive activity, aimed at redistribution of wealth cre-
ated by others (Murphy et al.,1993).
Deﬁnition 2 The shadow economy is a set of economic units that do not comply with
government-imposed taxes and regulations (Loayza, 1996).
The analysis that follows is inspired by Acemoglu (1995) who determines a reward
structure of society as a key factor for the allocation of talent. He develops a model of the
allocation of talent between productive and unproductive activities. The existence of rent-
seeking creates a negative externality on productive agents and implies that relative rewards
are endogenously determined. This creates multiple equilibria with diﬀerent reward struc-
tures. Society may get trapped in the rent-seeking equilibrium when previous and expected
allocations inﬂuence current rewards.
Another inspiration comes from the empirical ﬁndings of Johnson et al. (1998a, 1998b).
Although intuition and the results of the shadow economy literature suggest exactly the oppo-
site, these authors ﬁnd that ”higher taxation is correlated with a lower share of the unoﬃcial
economy”. This may point out that other factors (like corruption) are more important in
the ﬁrm’s decision to go underground. Indeed, in Johnson et al. (1998b) it is found that
”countries with more corruption have higher shares of the unoﬃcial economy”, and moreover,
”the extent of regulatory and bureaucratic discretion is a key determinant of underground
activity”. Conventionally, they also ﬁnd that corruption is associated with lower growth
(see also Mauro, 1995). Unfortunately, their theoretical investigation does not study the two
phenomena simultaneously.
A more comprehensive theoretical model in order to explore the link between the
shadow economy and rent-seeking is needed. This model will give us an understanding of
another aspect of a shadow sector, i.e. its role as a growth engine in an economy with inef-
ﬁcient institutions and poor provision of property rights. The model below aims to explain
the following stylized facts discovered in the recent literature:
1. Positive correlation between the shadow sector size and corruption index (countries
with more corruption have a larger shadow economy, Friedman et al., 2000);
2. Negative (counterintuitive, in the light of the shadow economy literature) correlation
between the unoﬃcial economy size and tax burden on the ﬁrm (Johnson et al., 1998a);
3. Negative correlation between corruption and growth (Mauro, 1995);
4. A persistent relation between the growth of the shadow sector and the output fall in
the countries during transition (Johnson et al.,1997; Matveenko et al., 1998);
5. Negative relationship between ﬁrm size and the bribe paid (EBRD, 1997; Clarke and
Xu, 2002).
23 The Model
Let us consider an economy with a continuum of identical ﬁrms. There are p rent-seekers in
the economy, and 1 − p producers. Entering the economy, every ﬁrm takes an irreversible
decision: either to become a producer or a rent-seeker. This decision is taken on the basis
of the expected net returns from each sector, VP and VR correspondingly. The ﬁrm observes
V = VP −VR, and becomes a producer if V> 0 and a rent-seeker if V< 0. Therefore, the set
of states {p ∈ [0,1] : V (p)=0 } are equilibria in this economy. This particular setting is taken
from the Acemoglu (1995) model, but the original form of the bribe function is changed, as
to avoid the model deﬁciency described in Appendix A.
This model of rent-seeking is modiﬁed by assuming that each producer is able to hide
a part of her output from the authorities. Following the empirical evidence, it is assumed
that the primary purpose of ”going shadow” is to avoid bribes and red tape and, only by
extension, taxation.
Thus, a producer is coerced into bribing every rent-seeker she meets (she gives out a
share z of her return as a bribe) and she also pays taxes at rate t. It is assumed here that rent-
seekers take into account the amount of taxes the ﬁrm pays. This makes sense in a transition
economy, where ﬁrms are often known to negotiate their taxes and bribes with the same
oﬃcials (Johnson et al., 1998a). This phenomenon also takes place in developed countries
(Ades and Tella, 1999). Such an assumption results in the tax rate and the bribe rate entering
multiplicatively in (3). For its shadow part of the output, a ﬁrm incurs additional cost, which
depends on the ability of the state to punish tax evaders.
It has been recently noticed that small ﬁrms pay a greater part of their return as a
bribe to authorities (Clarke, Xu, 2002; Pradhan et al., 2000). This would imply that the bribe
volume does not linearly depend on the amount of the bribe-giver’s output, as it is tempting
to assume. Therefore, in this model bribing is a costly process, and the bribe volume is
n o ta s s u m e dt od e p e n do nt h es i z eo ft h eﬁrm. The empirical result is then endogenously
obtained from the model (see stylized fact 5 and Proposition 4).
3.1 Production
A producer pays taxes and bribes on the disclosed (oﬃcial) output. She does not pay taxes
and bribes on the hidden (shadow) part, but does incur certain costs by ”going shadow”.
A producer chooses the share of the declared output in her production, and the amount to
invest, such that it maximizes the net return from production:
max
γ,x VP, (1)
where VP is a sum of oﬃcial and shadow production:
VP = VO + VS, (2)
VO =( 1 − t)((1− pz)YO − c(YO)), (3)
VS = YS − c(YS) − e c(YS). (4)
3Here, p is the probability for each of the producers of meeting a rent-seeker. When this
happens, the producer loses a part z of his revenues. YO and YS stand for the output of the
oﬃcial and shadow sectors correspondingly. It is also assumed that the tax authorities take
into account the ﬁrm’s production costs, while the bribe-taker does not.
We assume a quadratic cost function:
c(x)=
cx2
2
,
f o rp r o d u c t i o ni ng e n e r a l ,a n d
e c(x)=
kx2
2
, (5)
for the additional cost the ﬁrm pays working in the shadow economy. The (exoge-
nous) parameter k stands for the level of tax law enforcement, which can be changed by the
government policies.1 The larger k is, the larger the cost incurred by the ﬁrm that ”goes
shadow”.
It is implicitly assumed in (3) that there are no extra public goods for the oﬃcial
production. This assumption is reasonable because it is the same ﬁrm which produces oﬃcial
and shadow output. Therefore, it is diﬃcult to allow for using public goods only for its oﬃcial
production (see also Loayza, 1996). It has in fact been noticed that in transition countries the
ﬁrms usually produce shadow output using the technology and resources from their oﬃcial
part (see Matveenko et al., 1998 for a review).
3.2 Rent-Seeking
The net return to rent-seeking takes the following form:
VR =( 1− p)R(p), (6)
where (1 − p) is a probability of meeting a producer, and R(p) is a monotone function
of p. In Acemoglu (1995) the bribe function R(p) is assumed to be decreasing in p, however
its form is not uniquely described in the literature.
The decreasing function comes from the idea that the bribe-takers, if they are many,
compete for bribes and this reduces the return from rent-seeking. This is not questioned
here. However, when modeling this process in a search model the congestion eﬀect is already
incorporated in the search function: the more rent-seekers there are the less their chance is
of meeting and bribing a producer. Therefore the net return from rent-seeking falls with p.
1In general, it should be that k = k(T),where T is the amount of government revenues, ﬁnanced by the taxes
collected: T = tYo(1 − p),where Yo is a return from oﬃcial production (before taxes and bribes). However,
this complicates the solution without changing it much (see Johnson at al., 1998).
4As the empirical evidence does not explicitly make clear whether the bribe is a decreas-
ing or increasing function of p, it can arguably be increasing. In this case, combined with the
simplest matching function, one obtains the net return from rent-seeking of the Laﬀer-type
curve (i.e. increasing until a certain threshold and decreasing afterwards). This would model
an intuitive representation of the rent-seeking process, when the return from predation rises
until the number of rent-seekers crosses a certain threshold and they start competing for
bribes. The net return from rent-seeking would then start declining with p.
Clarke and Xu (2002) consider corruption in the utilities sector and argue that bribes
are higher in countries where other forms of corruption are more common. They also note
that, given limited enforcement resources, the possibility of being detected might be lower in
more corrupt societies. To make an example, imagine an economy with a large number of
rent-seekers who have a coordination device.2 They would then form a monopolistic bribe-
demanding body, and the size of each bribe would be higher than in the non-coordinated
case. It is also easy to imagine that the bribe-takers create the coordination device when
they are many, because of the percolation3 eﬀect. Moreover, it must usually be the case that
the bribe for a certain service can be given to only one oﬃcial due to their specialization: the
bribe is attributed not to the bribe-taker personally but to his position.
When a particular form of the bribe function is sought it is usually assumed to be
proportional to the ﬁrm’s size, and to be equal to the amount given out by an average
producer (like in Acemoglu, 1995). This paper uses a diﬀerent speciﬁcation for a good reason.
It turns out that in case when the simple matching function is taken, this standard bribe
function form yields only a single or none equilibria in the model. Appendix A shows why
this is the case in the Acemoglu’s model. In particular, it is shown that the high rent-seeking
equilibrium always lies outside the domain p ∈ [0,1], i.e. producers cease to exist. Because
the rent-seekers live at expense of producers, such economy will not be in equilibrium. Neither
p =1 ,w h e nVR >V P, would be one, for the same reason.
Therefore, a bribing technology with cost is introduced in this model. The cost of
bribing is always born: it is not only the pecuniary (or in kind) bribe that hampers the
growth of the enterprise but mostly red tape, and time and eﬀort spent to overcome it. It is,
for example, reported that managers in the CIS countries spend up to almost 17% of their
time on negotiations with the potential bribe-takers, and up to 60% of ﬁrms are reported to
bribe frequently (Hellman and Schankerman, 2000). Therefore, apart from the bribe itself,
there has to be a cost of bribing, borne either by the bribe-takers, the bribe-givers, or (most
probably) by both.
The main case considered here is an increasing function R(p), although in the Robust-
ness section it is shown that the main results would not change for any continuous function,
including a constant.
2Like, for example, the centralized hierarchical structure of bribe-taking process in Waller et al. (2000),
existence of which increases a volume of bribes taken.
3Percolation eﬀect is found in many natural phenomena. For example it explains the spreading of contagious
diseases. It is only when a signiﬁcant amount of people contract the virus that it becomes an epidemic. It is
said that the virus passes the percolation threshold. In the same way an endemic corruption can turn into an
epidemic through the percolation eﬀect.
53.3 Solution
3.3.1 The Producer’s Problem
According to the above, a producer solves the following problem.
max
γ,x (1 − t)((1 − pz)γx −
c(γx)2
2
)+( 1− γ)x −
cx2
2
+
c(γx)2
2
−
k(1 − γ)2x2
2
. (7)
Here p ∈ [0,1] is the number of rent-seekers. The other variables are: investment in
production, x ≥ 0; share of the oﬃcial production, γ ∈ [0,1]; share of return given as a bribe,
z ∈ [0,1] (practically, z ∈ [0,0.1]); tax rate, t ∈ [0,1]; level of tax law enforcement, k>0;
coeﬃcient of the production cost function, c>0.T h e ﬁrst order conditions give us the
following investment and share of the declared production: either {x∗ =0 ,γ∗ = 1
pz(1−t)+t},
or
x∗ = x(p)=
1
c
+
kpz(1 − t)
cΘ
, (8)
γ∗ = γ(p)=1+
pzc(1 − t)
Θ + kpz(1 − t)
, (9)
where Θ ≡ tc + tk − k<0. (10)
The producer can always choose to produce nothing, but hereafter it is assumed that
she does not. The following interesting properties of this solution would be useful for the
analysis of policy implications.
To make sure that the deﬁnition of rent-seeking holds, (10) is obtained form (8). This
implies a minimal level of law enforcement in existence: k>c t
1−t. In all that follows, it is
assumed to hold.
It follows from (8) and (10) that x0(p) < 0, i.e. that the higher the level of rent-seeking
in the economy, the lower the investments in production. If there are no rent-seekers in the
economy, it produces at its maximum, x(0) = 1
c. This supports the empirical evidence of the
strong negative correlation between corruption and growth/investment.
Substituting for Θ in (8), we obtain that ∂x
∂k =
pzt(1−t)
Θ2 > 0, independently of the sign
of Θ. Therefore, for each given number of rent-seekers, p, t h em o r et h et a xl a wi se n f o r c e d
(the larger k), the higher is the investment, x(p). This supports the intuitive relationship
between the rent-seeking and law enforcement: x(k
+,p), for each ﬁxed p.
It can be obtained from (9) that the optimal share of oﬃcial production, γ(p), is a
decreasing function of the number of rent-seekers in the economy, p, with its maximum in
the economy without rent-seekers, γ∗
max = γ∗(0) = 1. This mirrors the stylized fact about a
positive correlation between the shadow economy size and corruption: producers hide less if
rent-seekers are fewer.
Thus, with an increase in the number of rent-seekers in the economy, the shadow
economy size increases and output/investment falls (stylized fact 4).
6Proposition 3 The optimal net return from production, V ∗
P(p)=VP(γ∗,x ∗),i sam o n o -
tonically decreasing continuous function of the number of rent-seekers in the economy, on
p ∈ [0,1], and it is never negative.
Proposition 4 Everything else being equal, small ﬁrms hide more.
Proposition 4 draws upon the empirical evidence that small ﬁrms hide a larger part of
their output (stylized fact 5). This is another reason why corruption is so harmful for growth:
it particularly represses small and medium-sized enterprises.
3.3.2 The Rent-Seeker
The net return from rent-seeking depends on the probability of meeting a producer (conges-
tion eﬀect), and on the volume of a bribe:
VR =( 1− p)R(p). (11)
Let us consider a particular case of the functional form of the bribe function, R(p)=
1 − α + βp, with β > 0, and 1 − α > 0, which will assure the following properties of VR:t h e
net return from rent-seeking is increasing when p is small, and decreasing when p is larger
than
β+α−1
2β . The necessary assumptions for this are that α + β > 1,1 − α > 0,β > 0, or
α < 0,0 < β < 1 (this uses the fact that VR is a parabola in p). It also follows that the bribes
are not given when everybody is rent-seeking, VR(1) = 0. When everybody is producing, the
net return from rent-seeking is positive: VR(0) = 1 − α > 0. These functional forms ensure
the multiplicity of equilibria inside the domain.
This is, of course, an oversimplifying assumption. However, the model with VR that
depends on x undermines the multiplicity of equilibria (see Appendix A) and it is diﬃcult to
justify it empirically (see Section 3.2). In contradistinction, the chosen form of the bribing
function has numerous advantages. It is simple but produces the necessary stylized facts.
It gives an intuitive form of the net return function (Laﬀer-type curve), incorporating both
congestion and threshold eﬀects. It also produces the result ”small ﬁrms hide more” endoge-
nously, without having to assume it (see Proposition 4). Moreover, this bribing function is
robust to the parameter assumptions change, as long as it does not positively relate to x (see
Section 4.4). In Section 5 an extension of the model is presented where the cost of bribing
depends on x as, consequently, does R(p).
3.3.3 Existence of Equilibria
As all agents are identical by assumption, the set of equilibria in this model is described by
p∗,s u c ht h a tV (p∗) ≡ VR(p∗) − VP(p∗)=0 . It can be seen from Fig.1 that under certain
conditions multiple equilibria in this model exist.
Proposition 5 Three equilibria exist on the domain [0,1] if the following conditions hold:
(1) VR(0) <V P(0), i.e. if 1 − α < 1−t
2c ;
7(2) VP(
β+α−1
2β ) <V R(
β+α−1
2β )=m a xVR =
(β+α−1)2
4β .
Two of these equilibria are stable (p =0 , and p = p2) and one is unstable (p = p1),w h e r e
0 <p 1 <p 2.
I nF i g .1a nu p w a r ds h i f to ft h eVP curve corresponds to an increase in the net return
from production. It is shown in Section 4 that the curve moves upwards after introduction
of the shadow sector, or a reduction in k. As a result, the new ”bad” equilibrium has a lower
level of rent-seeking than the economy with a higher tax law enforcement. It is easy to see
that a decrease in law enforcement has no eﬀect on the rent-seeking-free (”good”) equilibrium.
This means that producers in the economy with high rent-seeking are actually better oﬀ if
the tax law enforcement is reduced. It also means that an increase in law enforcement in such
economies leads to even more corruption. In the lower graph, the function V (p)=VP − VR
is drawn and the equilibria of the dynamic model are shown.
3.3.4 No Shadow Case
Let us consider the case when there is no shadow sector. It is characterized by the following
conditions: k = ∞,t=0 . The restriction on t is needed to recreate an Acemoglu-type model
as a particular case inside the more general model under consideration: V ∗
P(t =0 ,k= ∞)=
limt→0 limk→∞ P(p,z,t,k,c)=l i m t→0(1−t)
(1−pz)2
2c =
(1−pz)2
2c . Leaving t unrestricted will not
change the results that follow.
Proposition 6 The roots of V (p) are real and belong to p ∈ [0,1] if the following conditions
hold:
2(1−z)(β+1−α)
(1+α)+2β+(β−α)2 <c< 1
2(1−α).
If the three equilibria exist in the no-shadow case, then in the presence of the shadow
sector either three or only one equilibrium (at p =0 ) exist. In the latter case, an introduction
of the shadow sector eliminates the high-corruption equilibrium, and the economy converges
to the ”good” equilibrium with no corruption.
4 Policy Implications
4.1 Impact of the shadow sector
Let us compare the economy which has no possibility of shadow production to the economy
where such a possibility exists. Doing a comparative statics exercise, one can trace the
directions in which the equilibria move, once the possibility to hide part of the output is
introduced to the purely production/rent-seeking economy.4 The possibility of hiding part of
4To evaluate the impact of the shadow sector, it is not necessary to assume that t =0 , as the net return
from production in the no-shadow case is:
e V
∗
P =l i m
k→∞
VP =
(1 − t)(1 − pz)
2
2c
≡ V
∗
P(k →∞ ).
8the output has a strictly positive impact on the net return from production in the economy
with high rent-seeking, and no impact in the economy with no rent-seeking. The more corrupt
the economy is, the bigger an eﬀect the shadow sector has on the aggregated net return from
production.
Proposition 7 The introduction of a possibility to ”go shadow” shifts the stable high rent-
seeking equilibrium (p = p2) to the left. This means that the shadow economy reduces the
equilibrium number of rent-seekers in the highly corrupt economies. It also extends the at-
tractor set of the no-rent-seeking equilibrium.
Boeri and Garibaldi (2000) point out that it is always possible to increase enforcement
so as to prevent the emergence of the shadow sector; however, it is not always desirable.
The propositions above give a new explanation of why it might be undesirable: the complete
extermination of the shadow economy through increased law enforcement rises corruption
level even more and harms all production in a rent-seeking society (more on this view in
Ades and Tella, 1999, and Garoupa, 1997).
4.2 Law enforcement and output
Let us now look at how law enforcement (like investment in tax police) inﬂuences the equi-
librium outcomes. It is shown on page 6 that law enforcement has a positive impact on
investments, x(p), for each given p. Indeed, an increase in law enforcement, k,m a k e st h e
graph of x(p) ﬂatter (x0(p) < 0), and investment x larger for each given p. However, as will
be shown below, an increase in law enforcement might have a negative impact on the equilib-
rium investment, by increasing an equilibrium number of rent-seekers in the economy. Even
more interestingly, it is demonstrated that the impact of an increase in law enforcement on
investment is negative in highly-corrupt economies, while it is positive in low-corrupt ones.
Proposition 8 An increase in law enforcement shifts the high rent-seeking equilibrium to
the right. It also increases the attractor set of the ’bad’ equilibrium at the expense of the
’good’ one. For the highly corrupt equilibrated economies, this implies that the more the law
is enforced the more corruption thrives.
Proposition 9 The increase in law enforcement has a positive impact on investment, in the
economy with no or little corruption, while it has a detrimental impact on the investment
(and therefore output) in the highly corrupt economy. This is an equilibrium process.
This implies that equilibrium investment increases (or does not change) if the law is
more enforced in those economies with little or no corruption, while it decreases in those
economies with high corruption. Note that in our model the output is a linear function of
investment, and therefore results for output would mirror the results for investment.
4.3 Law enforcement and shadow economy size
The next proposition shows that, as expected, an increase in law enforcement reduces the
share of the shadow economy in the economies with low corruption. Interestingly, the shadow
9economy grows if the law is more enforced in the highly corrupt society. Therefore, if an
economy is highly corrupt, the policies of direct deterrence of the shadow sector would have
an opposite eﬀect.
Proposition 10 The increase in law enforcement reduces the shadow sector in the economy
with no or little corruption, while it has an opposite impact in the highly corrupt economy.
This is an equilibrium process.
Thus, in the highly corrupt economies, policies of direct deterrence of the shadow
sector have an impact that is opposite to the desired one. This result is closely related to
the literature on state capture.5 In the light of this literature, the evident concentration of
the transition governments on ﬁghting the shadow economy, and their apparent disdain for
corruption, looks almost like a deliberate policy driven by state capture. It might also be
considered as a sign of the power war between the Maﬁa and the corrupt state, where tax
law enforcement is used as an instrument.
4.4 Robustness of Results
Bribing technology was introduced at the beginning of the paper, and certain assumptions
were taken about the size of the bribe requested by a corrupt agent. For obvious reasons, the
bribery process from the point of view of the bribe-taker has never been studied. Because of
this, there is no straightforward empirical evidence to indicate which assumption about the
bribing function is correct or more realistic. It might seem crucial for the model considered
here that the amount of bribe requested increases with the number of rent-seekers in the
economy. However, this is not so. Almost any form of this function (including a constant,
and a decreasing function, like in Acemoglu, 1995) would give the same results, as they do
not depend on the derivatives of R(p).6
Moreover, if more complicated assumptions of the bribe function were made (depen-
dence on the output of the ﬁrm, for example, as some empirical evidence suggests), it would
not change the results, provided that the matching function is correctly chosen. The depen-
dence of a bribe on the output of a ﬁrm would move the equilibria ”in the right direction”,
and would not alter the spirit of the results of the model under consideration.
5 Costly Bribing
Let us consider brieﬂy in this section an extension of the model above, where the government
introduces an anti-corruption campaign, so that bribing becomes costly. Let us also assume
that the cost of bribing is borne by the bribe-taker, independently of whether he can meet
5”In a decade of transition, fear of a leviathan state is giving way to increased focus on oligarchs who
”capture the state.” In the capture economy, the policy and legal environment is shaped to the captor ﬁrm’s
huge advantage, at the expense of the rest of the enterprise sector.” (cited from Hellman et. al, 2000)
6Actually, only the ﬁrst derivative of VP matters, while R(p),i fl i n e a ri np,i n ﬂuences only the second
derivative. An intuitive proof for this is in Fig.1. Imagine VR being any decreasing function: a straight line
or the Acemoglu’s type, and move the VP upwards. The directions where the equilibria move do not change.
However, one would have to adapt the model, in order to avoid the deﬁciency described in Apendix A.
10a producer. This is in line with the evidence. For example, Varese (2001) mentions an
identiﬁcation cost that the bribe-taker has to bear, which is that he has to signal to potential
bribe-givers that he would accept the bribe, if oﬀered. This story only makes sense if the
bribe-taker can be punished, which is assumed. The eradication of corruption is assumed to
be a public good, and to be paid from the taxes collected by the government:
Cb(p)=l(1 − t)(1 − pz)γ∗(p)x∗(p),0 <l≤ 1.
Then, the net return from rent-seeking becomes:
VR =( 1− p)(1 − α + βp) − l(1 − t)(1 − pz)(
1
c
+
kpz(1 − t)
cΘ
)(1 +
pzc(1 − t)
Θ + kpz(1 − t)
),
where Θ = kt+ct−k, and the value of l determines the strength of anti-corruption measures.
The rest of the model remains as before.
Proposition 11 (1) Anti-corruption measures have a strictly positive eﬀect on the highly-
corrupt economies in equilibrium.
(2) For the economy with no corruption, anti-corruption measures have positive eﬀect on the
equilibrium V (p).
(3) For the corrupt economy away from equilibrium, with p =1 , these measures have a positive
(short-run) eﬀect only when accompanied by tax law enforcement that fulﬁls the condition:
k>
tc(1−z)+cz
(1−t)(1−z).
When the direct deterrence measures actually increase both shadow economy and cor-
ruption, the anti-corruption campaign reduces the equilibrium corruption level, increases the
(comparative) net return from production and reduces the shadow economy share in the
output all together.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We have considered a model of an economy with producers and rent-seekers, where a possi-
bility to ”go shadow” exists for producers. It was found that introducing a shadow sector into
the pure production/predation model might eliminate the ”bad” equilibrium and make an
economy converge to the equilibrium with low level of rent-seeking under any initial condition
on p.
In line with empirical evidence, everything else being equal, small ﬁrms hide a larger
part of their output.
It turns out that the policies to reduce the size of the shadow economy through better
enforcement, which work in economies with low corruption, have an opposite eﬀect in the
economies locked-in to the rent-seeking equilibrium. In particular, an increase in enforcement
decreases production (both total and the oﬃcial share), and increases corruption level. The
introduction of a possibility to ”go shadow”, in the economy where it was perfectly enforced
before, does not have an impact on the incorrupt economy, while such a possibility is beneﬁcial
11for producers the higher is corruption. These results are robust to the choice of bribing
technology.
In the economy with an anti-corruption campaign, an increase in government spending
on it has a strictly positive impact on comparative net return from production. An increase in
the anti-corruption eﬀort reduces the equilibrium corruption level in the rent-seeking societies.
Thus, in such economies policies must be aimed at reducing corruption, and not at deterring
the shadow activities directly.
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137 Appendix A. Allocation of Talent Revisited
In this appendix the Acemoglu (1995) model is brieﬂy considered, with the forms of functions
used in his example (which was to show a possible existence of a real economy with multiple
equilibria). The reason for doing so is that while the rent-seeker in his model is similar to
the one considered above, he obtains a result which I could not replicate. I did obtain the
multiple equilibria case, however one of the equilibria would always lie outside the domain
(i.e., when the number of rent-seekers is higher than the total number of agents). This outer
equilibrium would also be on the increasing part of the net return functions, which does not
make much economic sense.
In that case, the economy would always have one equilibrium outside the domain, and
therefore the economy would seem to have a ’forced equilibrium’ in the point where everyone
seeks rents (p =1 ). However, if everybody is seeking rents, the net return from rent-seeking
VR cannot be positive, because when nothing is produced nothing can be extorted by the
rent-seekers. Neither it can be larger than the net return from production. Therefore, there
cannot be any ’forced equilibrium’ at p =1 , and the economy would have either one or none
equilibrium.
The proof of this statement follows.
An agents makes the irreversible decision of whether to become a producer or a rent-
seeker on the basis of net returns from these activities:
VP =( 1− pz)(α + x) − c(x), (12)
VR =( 1− p)R(p)=( 1− p)j(α + x). (13)
In (12), VP is the net return from production, where p is the number of rent-seekers in
the economy, z(≡ 1 − q in the original paper) is the share or return that is taken as a bribe,
(α+x) is a return from production, and c(x)=d+ cx2
2 is the cost function (d ≡ c0 and c ≡ c1
in the original paper).
In (13), VR is the net return from rent-seeking, where (1−p) is the number of producers,
and j(≡ γ in the original paper) is a share of output that the rent-seeker gets (j ≤ z).
Then, after the producer maximizes his net return by choosing the amount of investment
x, the equilibrium condition becomes:
V (p)=VP − VR =
(1 − pz)2
2c
+( 1− pz)α − d − (1 − p)j(α +
1 − pz
c
), (14)
where
1−pz
c =a r gm a x x(VP).
The equation
V (p)=0 (15)
14gives us the set of equilibria:
p1,2(z,c,α,d,j)=
1
z(z − 2j)
(αcz + z(1 − j) − j(αc + j) ±
±
¡
j2(1 + αc)2 − 2jzαc(j + αc) − 2j2z(1 − z)+α2c2z2 +2 zdc(z − 2j
¢
)
1
2), (16)
Proposition 12 The problem (15) always has one root that is larger than 1,a n dt h e r e f o r e
has either one or no roots on the domain interval p ∈ [0,1].
Proof. From (16) it follows that p1(0,c,α,d,j)=−
αc+(1−j)+(j2+α2c2+2dc)
1
2
2j < 0,
limz→∞ p1(z,c,α,d,j)=l i m z→∞ p2(z,c,α,d,j)=0 , and that
limz→1 p1(z,c,α,d,j)=1+
αc(1−j)+(α2c2(1−j)2+2dc(1−2j))
1
2
1−2j > 1 (if 1 − 2j>0, and < 1 other-
wise), limz→1 p2(z,c,α,d,j)=1+
αc(1−j)−(α2c2(1−j)2+2dc(1−2j))
1
2
1−2j < 1 (if 1 − 2j>0, and > 1
otherwise).
Therefore, if the root is a function of z, p1(z),i tt u r n so u tt h a tt h e r ei sa l w a y sar o o t
that is larger than one. If 1 − 2j>0, it is p1,a n di f1 − 2j<0, it is p2.7
It is documented in various empirical studies of corruption that a ﬁrm in CIS countries,
where corruption is the highest in the world, pays an amount of bribes that does not exceed
8.1% of its revenues (See Hellman and Schankerman, (2002), and also Pradhan et al. (2000),
Kaufmann et al. (1999)). Consequently, z cannot be much higher than 0.08. It must be said
that theoretically the size of z might be not important; however, when one starts introducing
the shadow economy into the picture, it becomes such, and therefore the issue of multiple
equilibria existence becomes crucial. Moreover, the next proposition shows that in the case
explicitly considered by Acemoglu (1995), i.e. when z =1 , the multiple equilibria case here
never occurs, whatever the value of j.
Proposition 13 In the model with z =1(equivalent to Acemoglu’s model with q =0 ), the
multiple equilibria case never occurs on the domain p ∈ [0,1].
Proof. To the problem V (p,z =1 ,c,α,d,j)=0 , the solution is
p1,2 =1+
1
(1 − 2j)
³
αc(1 − j) ∓ (α2c2j2 +( 1− 2j)(α2c2 +2 cd))
1
2
´
.
Where p2 > 1 holds if 1 − 2j>0,i . e .i fj<1/2. Therefore, it would be required that
j>1/2 for this root to be smaller than one, i.e. 1 − 2j<0. For this to hold:
1
(1 − 2j)
³
αc(1 − j) − (α2c2j2 +( 1− 2j)(α2c2 +2 cd))
1
2
´
< 0.
7Due to the argument below, z cannot be much bigger than 0.08 in the real economies, and from the
consideration that j must be smaller than or equal to z (for the balance to hold), the real economy assumption
would be 1 − 2j>0. Thus, it is always p1 which is larger than one.
15In other words, it is necessary that αc(1−j)−(α2c2j2 +(1−2j)(α2c2 +2cd))
1
2 < 0 as
well, or that αc(1−j) < (α2c2j2 +(1−2j)(α2c2 +2cd))
1
2 and α2c2j2 ≥ (1−2j)(α2c2 +2cd),
which always holds because 1 − 2j<0 was assumed before and l.h.s. is always greater than
zero.
Then,
α2c2 − 2jα2c2 + j2α2c2 < α2c2j2 +( 1− 2j)(α2c2 +2 cd),
α2c2(1 − 2j) < (1 − 2j)(α2c2 +2 cd),
α2c2 > α2c2 +2 cd, and
0 > 2cd, which never holds, as c and d are always positive. If either of them is zero, then
p1 = p2 =1 . We have come to a contradiction. Thus, in this model both roots simultaneously
cannot be smaller than one, and therefore there is always only one equilibrium deﬁned as a
solution to V (p)=0 .
These propositions show that the model with the bribe proportional to the return from
production does not have a multiple equilibria case that would be possible to modify for a
three-sector model. It is related to the form of the matching function and the net return
functions, which result in the net returns being ’parallel’ to each other. Therefore, I return
in this paper to the more general version of the Acemoglu (1995) model, with the net return
from rent-seeking being equal to VR =( 1− p)R(p), where R(p) is the bribe which depends
on p, and not on the return of the bribe-payer. There is also anecdotal evidence from the
corrupt countries that the bribe size does not change depending on the return of the payer,
but the amount paid diﬀers as a percentage of the return (therefore, becoming too big for
the small ﬁrms).
8 Appendix B. Proofs of Propositions
Proof. (Proposition 3)
After substituting for γ and x, in (7), it is obtained: VP(p,z,t,k,c)=1−t
2
³
(1−pz)2
c −
(pz)2
tc−k+tk
´
>
0 always, as it is assumed that Θ = tc − k + tk < 0.
Proof. (Proposition 4)
It follows from the above that γ∗(x)=−
pz(1−t)+t
x(k−tc) + k
k−tc, and therefore γ is positively corre-
lated with x, i.e. large ﬁrms have larger share of output produced oﬃcially.
Proof. (Proposition 5)
See Fig.1. It is easy to see that : (1) VP(0) = 1−t
2c and VR(0) = 1−α;( 2 )VP(1) > 0,V R(1) = 0.
Then, for the curves VP and VR to have two intersections on the domain, it is needed that
maxVP ≥ VR(argmax(VP)),a sargmax(VR)=1
2(1 − 1−α
β ) and maxVR =
(β+α−1)2
4β .
If these hold, then in the dynamic version of the model p would decrease if {(p<
p1)∪(p>p 2)} because then VP >V R and it is more beneﬁcial to become a producer than a
rent-seeker. The number of rent-seekers, p, would increase if p1 <p<p 2,a st h e nVR >V P
and it is more beneﬁcial to become a rent-seeker than a producer. Therefore, {p =0 ,p= p2}
are the stable equilibria, and {p = p1} is an unstable one.
Proof. (Proposition 6)
1 − α − β < 0 and 1 − α > 0 hold by construction.
16e VP =l i m k→∞limt=0(VP−VR)=1
2
p2z2−2pz+2cβp2−2cpα−2c+1+2cp+2cα−2cβp
c =0in the equilibria.
The roots are real if the discriminant c2 +2c2β −2zc−2c2α+c2β2 +2cβz −2c2βα+2zcα+
c2α2 − 2cβ +2 z2c − 2z2cα > 0 or c>
2(1−z)(β+1−α)
(1+α)+2β+(β−α)2.
And for them to lie in the domain interval [0,1], they must both be less than one and larger
than zero. For the roots to be positive, their sum and their product must be positive:
p1 + p2 = −
2c−2cβ−2z−2cα
2cβ+z2 > 0, holds if 1 − α − β < 0;
p1p2 = −2c+1+2cα
2cβ+z2 > 0, holds if 2c< 1
1−α.
In general, the less strict inequality would have to hold for the roots being less than
one. However, the following happens to be true under assumptions of the model:
p1 + p2 < 1. I.e. −
2c−2cβ−2z−2cα
2cβ+z2 < 1 ⇔ 1 − α >
−z(1−z)
2c always holds, if 1 − α > 0, which
holds by construction of VR.
Proof. (Proposition 7)
Let ∆V = V ∗
P − e V ∗
P, then the shadow sector would have a positive impact on the net return
from production, if ∆V> 0. If k →∞ , then from (9) it follows that γ∗(p)=1 , i.e. all
production would be declared. Then, ∆V = 1−t
2
³
(1−pz)2
c −
(pz)2
tc−k+tk
´
− 1
2 (1 − t)
(1−pz)2
c =
1−t
2
(pz)2
−Θ > 0 always, if Θ = tc − k + tk < 0, as has been assumed throughout. In particular,
∆V (p =0 )=0 , and ∆V (p =1 )=1
2 (−1+t) z2
tc−k+tk > 0.
Therefore, due to the continuity and monotonicity of VP, the net return curve for
production shifts upwards for all p>0, and the shift would be larger for larger p. However, it
must be mentioned that the assumption that Θ < 0 implies the lower limit of law enforcement,
under which this proposition holds: k>c t
1−t. This means that tax law enforcement must
reach a certain minimal level for the result to hold.
Proof. (Proposition 8)
The function V (p,z,t,k,c,α,β)=
(1−t)
2 (
(1−pz)2
c −
p2z2
tk+tc−k) − (1 − p)(1 − α + βp) determines
equilibrium p in this economy: V (p,z,t,k,c,α,β)=0 . Let us examine how a change in k
inﬂuences p. By the implicit function theorem,
dp
dk
= −
dV
dk
dV
dp
,
also dV
dk = −
(1−t)2z2p2
2(tc−k+kt)2 < 0, and therefore sign(
dp
dk)=sign(dV
dp ).
We already know that function V (p) has two roots on p ∈ [0,1], and therefore dV
dp < 0,
if p<b p,a n ddV
dp > 0, if p>b p : p1 < b p<p 2, where p1 and p2 are the roots of V (p)=0 ,
i.e. the equilibria. Therefore,
dp
dk < 0 for the low-corrupt economies, and
dp
dk > 0 for the
highly-corrupt ones. It is also obvious from the above, that increase in law enforcement, k,
moves the p2 equilibrium to the right (increasing the attractor set of the ’bad’ equilibrium).
Proof. (Proposition 9)
Let us consider a formula of optimal investment (8). In the equilibrium, p = p(k),a n d
therefore
dx(p(k))
dk = dx
dp
dp
dk, where dx
dp < 0, is known, see pg.6. Therefore, the equilibrium
investment, unlike the oﬀ-equilibrium one, moves in the opposite direction from equilibrium
corruption, when law enforcement is increased.
17Proof. (Proposition 10)
The proof is analogous to the previous proposition. Let us consider a formula of optimal
investment (8). In the equilibrium, p = p(k), and therefore
dγ(p(k))
dk =
dγ
dp
dp
dk, where
dγ
dp < 0 (see
pg. 6). Therefore, sign(
dγ(p(k))
dk )=−sign(
dp(k)
dk )=
½
> 0, for low corrupt economies
< 0, for highly corrupt economies
¾
,
by Proposition 8. Therefore, the equilibrium share of the oﬃcial sector in the output in the
highly corrupt economies decreases when tax law enforcement is increased.
Proof. (Proposition 11)
In the equilibrium with no corruption:
dV (p=0)
dl = 1−t
c > 0.
In the equilibrium with high corruption,
dV (p,z,t,k,c,α,β,l)
dl =( 1− t)(1− pz)
−Θ+pz(Θ−c)
−cΘ > 0 if −Θ + pz(Θ − c) > 0.
It is required that pz > Θ
Θ−c, which always holds because r.h.s. is always less than zero, and
p and z are positive. It is also known that
dp
dl = −
dV
dl
dV
dp
< 0 for p = p2, as the V (p) is increasing in that part of the domain interval.
Away from equilibrium, when also p =1:
dV (p=1)
dl =( 1− t)(1− z)
Θ(1−z)+cz
cΘ > 0 if θ(1 − z)+cz < 0 (because Θ < 0).
(tc − k + tk)(1 − z)+cz = −(1 − t)(1− z)k + tc(1 − z)+cz < 0,
k>
tc(1−z)+cz
(1−t)(1−z).
9A p p e n d i x C . N o t a t i o n
VO - net return from oﬃcial production,
VS - net return from shadow production,
VR - net return from rent-seeking,
VP - net return from all production (sum of shadow and oﬃcial),
e VP - net return from all production, when there is no possibility to ”go shadow”,
t -t a xr a t e ,
γ - share of the declared output in the whole production,
x - investment in a linear production function,
c -c o e ﬃcient of the cost function for production,
c(x) - technical cost of any production with investment x, both for shadow and declared
activity,
k - ability of the state to catch tax evaders, such that e c(x) - corresponding additional
cost of going shadow is linear in k,w i t hap o s i t i v ec o e ﬃcient;
p - number of rent-seekers, and 1 − p,n u m b e ro fp r o d u c e r s ,
z =1− q - part of the return that a ﬁrm pays as a bribe,
R(p) - bribe required by an oﬃcial.
Throughout the text, a simplifying parameter is introduced: Θ ≡ tk + tc − k, which
stands for the relative value of the tax law enforcement and production cost of a ﬁrm.
18Vp
VR
V
p
p
1
1
p1
p2
p2
p1
0
0
Vp
VP,R
1-α
(1-t)/(2c)
(β+α−1)/(2β)
Figure 1: Equilibria of the model
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